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This paper proposes a framework for studying competitive mixed bundling
with an arbitrary number of rms. We examine both a rms incentive to
introduce mixed bundling and equilibrium tari¤s when all rms adopt the
mixed-bundling strategy. In the duopoly case, relative to separate sales, mixed
bundling has ambiguous impacts on prices, prot and consumer surplus; with
many rms, however, mixed bundling typically lowers all prices, harms rms
and benets consumers.
Keywords: bundling, multiproduct pricing, price competition, oligopoly
JEL classication: D43, L13, L15
1 Introduction
There are many circumstances where consumers are o¤ered a package of products at
a discounted price relative to the sum of the component prices. This selling strategy
is called mixed bundling. Examples include software suites, TV-internet-phone
bundles, home and auto insurance bundles, package tours, value meals, lawn care
and landscaping packages, gas and electricity in some regions, and so on. (In the
extreme form of pure bundling,all component products are sold in a package only
and no individual products are available for purchase.)
The possible rationales for bundling and the impact of bundling on market per-
formance are classic economic questions that have received wide attention. Early
research on bundling focuses on the monopoly case. It is pointed out that, aside
from some obvious reasons such as the cost savings in production and transactions,
I am grateful to the editor, an associate editor, three anonymous referees, Mark Armstrong,
Barry Nalebu¤, Andrew Rhodes, and Mike Riordan for their helpful comments.
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bundling can be a strategy to price discriminate and extract more surplus from con-
sumers (e.g., Stigler (1968), Adams and Yellen (1976), and McAfee, McMillan, and
Whinston (1989)).1 Bundling can also be used by a multiproduct rm to exclude
smaller rivals that only supply a subset of the products (e.g., Whinston (1990), Choi
and Stefanadis (2001), Carlton and Waldman (2002), and Nalebu¤ (2004)). This is
the usual antitrust concern about bundling.
In many examples of bundling, however, the market structure is relatively sta-
ble and several competing multiproduct rms operate there. In that case, bundled
discounting is usually not intended to exclude rivals from the market but is simply
a business strategy to attract consumers to buy more products from the same rm.
This paper studies mixed bundling in such a competitive environment. Given the
prevalence of bundled discounting among competing rms, there is already substan-
tial research on this phenomenon, such as Matutes and Regibeau (1992), Anderson
and Leruth (1993), Reisinger (2004), Thanassoulis (2007, 11), and Armstrong and
Vickers (2010). Nevertheless, all the existing papers focus on the duopoly case.
Little is understood about how the degree of competition in terms of the number
of rms might a¤ect rms incentives to adopt the mixed-bundling strategy and
the impact of mixed bundling on market performance. This is the rst paper that
studies competitive mixed bundling with an arbitrary number of rms. It makes the
following contributions.
First, we o¤er a random-utility framework for studying competitive mixed bundling.
To have product di¤erentiation,2 the existing works usually use a two-dimensional
Hotelling model where consumers with di¤erent preferences for products are distrib-
uted on a square. In a multiproduct environment, it is not convenient to extend this
spatial approach of product di¤erentiation to the case with more than two rms. In
this paper, we instead adopt a multiproduct version of the random utility framework
in Perlo¤ and Salop (1985). This framework can easily accommodate any number
of rms; in the duopoly case, it can be converted into a two-dimensional Hotelling
model such that we can compare our results with those in the existing literature.3
Second, we extend the existing insights on a rms incentive to use the mixed-
bundling strategy (e.g., from McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989), and Chen
1See, for example, also Long (1984), Schmalensee (1984), Fang and Norman (2006), and Chen
and Riordan (2013).
2Introducing product di¤erentiation is necessary for studying competitive bundling if rms have
similar cost conditions. Otherwise, prices would settle at marginal costs and there would be no
meaningful scope for o¤ering a bundling discount.
3Anderson and Leruth (1993) also use a random-utility framework in their duopoly model of
mixed bundling, but they focus on the logit setting where the utility shock follows the extreme
value distribution. Another important di¤erence is that in our model the utility shock is at the
level of individual products, while in Anderson and Leruth (1993) the utility shock is at the bundle
level (so that a consumer might like both products individually but dislike the package of the two
products).
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and Riordan (2013)) to a general oligopoly model. The oligopoly problem can actu-
ally be formulated as a monopoly problem but with a random outside option that
depends on the equilibrium prices. The particular structure of the outside option in
a symmetric competition environment enables us to obtain some clean results. For
instance, for any continuous joint valuation distribution, each rm has a unilateral
incentive to introduce mixed bundling when there are only two rms,4 or when there
are many rms and a certain tail-behavior condition is satised.
Third, we explain why the problem of mixed bundling is much harder once we go
beyond duopoly. The main challenge, when there are more than two rms, is how
to calculate a rms demand. From a rm, a consumer can buy both products, one
product only, or nothing. In the third option, the consumer can buy both products
from a single rival rm to take advantage of its bundling discount or mix and match
across all rival rms to assemble a better bundle. Which is better depends on
whether the best matched products among the rival rms are from the same rm
or two di¤erent rms and also depends on the magnitude of the bundling discount.
We develop an approach to calculate the demand and characterize the necessary
conditions for a mixed-bundling equilibrium (if it exists). However, the equilibrium
conditions are hard to deal with in general, and further analytical progress is made
only in the duopoly case and the case with many rms. In particular, in the latter
case, the equilibrium prices typically have a simple approximation: the bundling
discount is approximately equal to half of the single-product markup. When the
production cost is zero, the approximate pricing scheme features 50% o¤ for the
second product.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we show that the impacts of mixed
bundling on market prices, prot and consumer welfare can qualitatively depend
on the number of rms in the market.5 The example often highlighted in the exist-
ing research is when consumers are uniformly distributed on the Hotelling square. In
that case, compared to separate sales, bundling reduces all prices, harms rms and
benets consumers. This leads to the usual perception that mixed bundling is pro-
competitive. In this paper, we rst argue that this insight is incomplete. There are
many other duopoly examples with di¤erent valuation distributions where bundling
raises single-product prices or even all prices relative to separate sales so that it is
possible for bundling to benet rms and harm consumers or even harm all players.
Therefore, in duopoly the impacts of mixed bundling are in general ambiguous, and
we should be cautious about the policy implications drawn from some convenient
examples such as the widely used Hotelling model with uniformly distributed con-
4A similar duopoly result is also derived by Armstrong and Vickers (2010) in their Hotelling
setup.
5With the assumption of full market coverage, bundling must always harm total welfare as it
causes too much one-stop shopping and so sub-optimal match between consumers and products.
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sumers. However, with many rms, we show that mixed bundling has less ambiguous
impacts, and it usually makes all products cheaper, and therefore harms rms and
benets consumers.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. The bundling discount creates
a new competition boundary on which consumers are indi¤erent between buying
both products from a rm and buying both from its rivals. For these marginal
consumers, if the rm makes one of its single products slightly cheaper (but keeps
the price of the other single product and the bundling discount unchanged), they will
switch to buying both products from it. This renders the price reduction doubly
protable,which is a force for bundling to intensify price competition and which is
emphasized in the literature. However, the bundling discount also shifts the position
of all the marginal consumers who will respond to a rms price reduction and so
potentially changes their density. This e¤ect is subtler and depends on the shape
of the consumer valuation distribution. For example, in the Hotelling model with a
uniform distribution, this second e¤ect does not exist because the position of those
marginal consumers does not a¤ect their density. This is why in that case all prices
go down in the regime of mixed bundling. For other distributions, it can be well
the case that the bundling discount decreases the density of marginal consumers,
which goes against and sometimes even dominates the double prote¤ect. This
is the source of the potentially ambiguous impacts of mixed bundling. However, if
the bundling discount is small, we show that the second e¤ect is of second order
relative to the double prote¤ect, and so mixed bundling intensies competition.
In other words, a small bundling discount is generally pro-competitive. When there
are many rms, competition leaves little scope for o¤ering a bundling discount and
the discount is indeed small in equilibrium. This explains why mixed bundling has
unambiguous impacts when there are many rms.
Among the existing papers on competitive mixed bundling, Armstrong and Vick-
ers (2010) is the most general study so far if there are only two rms and each
consumer needs to buy all products.6 They consider a general symmetric consumer
distribution on the Hotelling square, allow for the existence of an exogenous shop-
ping cost and also consider elastic demand and general nonlinear pricing schedules.
Our paper is more general in terms of considering more than two rms, but oth-
erwise, it focuses on the simple case with unit demand and without an exogenous
shopping cost. Some of our analysis (e.g., the local-deviation argument used in
various places) parallels theirs.
There are also many works on competitive pure bundling. See, for example,
Matutes and Regibeau (1988), Economides (1989), Kim and Choi (2015), Zhou
6Thanassoulis (2007, 11) study the case when some smallconsumers only need one product
and highlight the possible distributional e¤ect of bundling on di¤erent types of consumers. This
consumer heterogeneity is absent in both Armstrong and Vickers (2010) and this paper.
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(2017), Hurkens, Jeon, and Menicucci (2019), and Shuai, Yang, and Zhang (2019).7
The random-utility framework used in this paper follows Zhou (2017). Pure bundling
is easier to deal with, so more analytical progress has been made there in a general
oligopoly model. It is shown that compared to separate sales, pure bundling tends to
relax price competition when the number of rms is above a threshold. A somewhat
opposite result is derived in this paper for mixed bundling. This contrast highlights
an important di¤erence between mixed and pure bundling: with mixed bundling,
the bundling discount is endogenous and becomes small when there are many rms,
while pure bundling is like mixed bundling with a xed and su¢ ciently large discount
regardless of the number of rms. As discussed above, the pro-competitiveness of
mixed bundling when there are many rms relies on the discount being small in
equilibrium.
Bundling has also been studied in other competitive environments such as auc-
tions. See, for instance, Zhou (2017) for a discussion on how pure bundling among
competing rms is related to pure bundling in multi-object auctions as studied in
Palfrey (1983) and Chakraborty (1999) (and also to information disclosure in single-
object auctions as studied in Board (2009) and Ganuza and Penalva (2010)). From
a mechanism-design perspective, Armstrong (2000), Avery and Hendershott (2000),
and Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2007) study the possibility of mixed
bundling being a feature of revenue-maximizing design in multi-object auctions. The
rst two papers mainly focus on the case with binary valuations; in a setup with
continuous valuations, Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2007) show that
introducing a discount for the bidder who receives the whole package of objects im-
proves the revenue relative to separate sales and pure bundling. They also calculate
the optimal discount in a two-bidder example. This strand of research, however, is
very di¤erent from studying the equilibrium mixed-bundling tari¤among competing
rms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
studies the benchmark case of separate sales. Section 3 examines a rms individual
incentive to introduce a bundling discount. Section 4 characterizes the demand and
the equilibrium pricing schedule when all rms use the mixed-bundling strategy and
also derives the general formulas of how mixed bundling a¤ects industry prot and
consumer surplus compared to separate sales. Section 5 deals with two special cases
with two or many rms. Section 6 discusses issues such as multi-stop shopping cost
and bundling premium, and Section 7 concludes. All omitted proofs are presented
in the appendix.
7See Section 7 in Stole (2007) and Section 4 in Armstrong (2016) for surveys of the literature
on competitive bundling.
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2 The model and the benchmark
Consider a market where each consumer needs to buy two products 1 and 2. The
measure of consumers is normalized to one. There are n  2 rms, each supplying
both products. The unit production cost of each product is normalized to zero,
so we can regard prices as markups. Each product is horizontally di¤erentiated
across rms (e.g., each rm produces a di¤erent variety of the product), but there
is no product compatibility issue and consumers can freely mix and match. We
adopt a multiproduct version of the random utility framework in Perlo¤ and Salop
(1985) to model product di¤erentiation. Let Xk  (Xk1 ; Xk2 ), k = 1;    ; n, denote
the random match utilities of rm ks two products for a consumer, and they are
privately observed by the consumer. We assume that Xk is i.i.d. across consumers
(e.g., consumers have idiosyncratic tastes for the products from di¤erent rms), and
is also i.i.d. across rms (so rms are ex ante symmetric). SupposeXk is distributed
according to a common joint cumulative distribution function (cdf) F (x1; x2). F
has a full-dimensional support S  R2 and a bounded and di¤erentiable probability
density function (pdf) f(x1; x2). Let Fi(x) and fi(x), i = 1; 2, be the marginal cdf
and pdf of Xki , and let [xi; xi] be its support (where xi =  1 and xi = 1 are
allowed). We generally allow correlation in a consumers match utilities for the two
products supplied by the same rm; but for some results we consider the special
i.i.d.case with F (x1; x2) = F1(x1)F2(x2) and F1 = F2, i.e., the case when the two
products in each rm are symmetric and have independent match utilities.
We consider a discrete-choice framework where the incremental utility from con-
suming more than one variety of a product is zero and so a consumer only wants to
buy one variety of each product.8 We also assume that a consumer has unit demand
for her preferred variety of each product. If a consumer consumes two products with
match utilities (x1; x2) (which can be purchased from di¤erent rms) and makes a
total payment T , she obtains surplus (x1 + x2)  T .9
If a rm sells its two products separately, it chooses a price vector (p̂1; p̂2). Let
P̂  p̂1 + p̂2 be the associated bundle price. If a rm adopts the mixed-bundling
strategy, it chooses a pair of single-product prices (p1; p2) together with a bundling
discount  > 0.10 Let P  p1+p2  be the associated bundle price. In either regime
8This assumption is standard in the literature on competitive bundling, though it is not always
without loss of generality. For example, reading another article on the same subject in a di¤erent
newspaper, or reading another chapter on the same topic in a di¤erent textbook, sometimes im-
proves utility. There are works on consumer demand which extend the usual discrete choice model
by allowing consumers to consume multiple versions of a product (see, e.g., Gentzkow (2007)).
9Most of bundling papers assume such an additive utility function, and this is also compatible
with perfect complements under the assumption of full market coverage. There is some research
which studies bundling of substitutes or complements (see, e.g., Long (1984), Armstrong (2013),
and Haghpanah and Hartline (2019)).
10We assume that consumer purchase cannot be monitored and so it is impossible to implement
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the timing is that rms choose their prices simultaneously, and then consumers make
their choices after observing all the match utilities and prices. As often assumed in
the literature on competitive bundling, the market is fully covered (i.e., all consumers
buy both products). This will be the case if consumers do not have outside options,
or if they have a su¢ ciently high basic valuation for each product on top of the
above match utilities.
For convenience, we introduce a few pieces of notation. Denote by





the match utility of rm ks best rival product i, and by
Zki  Xki   Y  ki
the match utility of rm ks product i relative to its best rival product. When rms
sell their products separately and charge the same prices, a consumer will buy rm




i are independent of each
other given Xki is i.i.d. across rms. Since rms are symmetric, we suppress the
superscripts k and  k thereafter.
LetG(y1; y2)  F (y1; y2)n 1 be the joint cdf of (Y1; Y2), g(y1; y2) be the associated





F (y1 + z1; y2 + z2)dG(y1; y2) ;
and let h(z1; z2) be the associated joint pdf. (Whenever there is no confusion we
ignore the integral region S thereafter.) The marginal cdf of Zi is Hi(zi) 
R
Fi(y+
zi)dGi(y) with support [xi   xi; xi   xi], and let hi(zi) be the associated marginal








Here Hi(0) is the chance that a rms product i is worse than its best rival product,
and hi(0) is the density of consumers who are indi¤erent between this rms product
i and its best rival product.
Separate-sales benchmark. We rst report the equilibrium in the benchmark
regime of separate sales. Since rms compete on each product separately, the mar-
ket for each product is an independent Perlo¤-Salop model where only the marginal
distribution of that products match utility matters. Consider the market for prod-
uct i, and let p̂i be the (symmetric) equilibrium price.11 Suppose a rm deviates to
a pricing strategy with a bundling premium  < 0. See Section 6.2 for a further discussion.
11In the duopoly case, Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) have shown that the pricing game has no asym-
metric equilibrium. Beyond duopoly Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) show that there is no asymmetric
equilibrium in the logit model. More recently, Quint (2014) proves a general result (see Lemma 1
there) which implies that our pricing game of separate sales has no asymmetric equilibrium if fi is
log-concave.
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price p̂0i, while other rms stick to the equilibrium price p̂i. Then the demand for
the deviating rms product i is
qi(p̂
0
i) = Pr[Xi   p̂0i > Yi   p̂i] = 1 Hi(p̂0i   p̂i) :
In equilibrium the demand is qi(p̂i) = 1n due to rm symmetry, and this is also easy
to see by using (1).
The deviating rms prot from product i is p̂0iqi(p̂
0
i), and for p̂i to be the equilib-






where hi(0) is dened in (1). Henceforth, we assume that this rst-order condition
is also su¢ cient for dening the equilibrium price. This is the case, for example,
when fi is log-concave (see Caplin and Nalebu¤(1991)).12 In the example of uniform
distribution with Fi(x) = x, we have hi(0) = 1 and so p̂i = 1=n. In the example of
extreme value distribution with Fi(x) = e e
 x
(which generates the logit model), we
have hi(0) = (n  1)=n2 and so p̂i = n=(n  1). Generally, p̂i decreases in n if fi is
log-concave (see, e.g., Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov (1995), and Zhou (2017)),
and limn!1 p̂i = 0 if and only if limx!xi
fi(x)
1 Fi(x) =1 (see Zhou (2017)). The latter
must be true if fi is strictly positive on a bounded support.
3 Incentive to use mixed bundling
We rst examine, starting from separate sales, whether a rm has a unilateral in-
centive to introduce the mixed-bundling strategy (so that separate sales cannot be
an equilibrium outcome). We need another two pieces of notation: the cdf of Zi,




hi( ijzj)d i ;
where hi( ijzj)  h( i; zj)=hj(zj) is the conditional pdf of Zi.
Suppose a rm unilaterally deviates from separate sales and introduces a small
bundling discount  > 0 (but keeps its single-product prices the same as in the
separate-sales equilibrium). Figure 1 below depicts how this small deviation a¤ects
consumer demand in the space of (z1; z2), where 
i, i = 1; 2, indicates consumers who
buy only product i from the rm in question and 
b indicates consumers who buy
both products from it. (This local-deviation approach follows McAfee, McMillan,
and Whinston (1989) who study bundling incentive in the monopoly case. Figure 1
below is similar to their Figure III.)
12Many often used distributions such as uniform, normal, logistic, and extreme value have a log-
concave density. Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) provide a weaker su¢ cient condition which requires
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buy both from
other rms
Figure 1: The impact of a small bundling discount on demand
The negative e¤ect of the deviation is that the deviating rm earns  less from
the consumers who buy both products from it. In the regime of separate sales, the
measure of those consumers is

b = 1 H1(0) H2(0) +H(0; 0) =
2
n
  1 +H(0; 0) ;
where we have used Hi(0) = 1  1n . So the (rst-order) loss from the small deviation
is 
b.
The positive e¤ect of the deviation is that more consumers buy both products
from the deviating rm, i.e., the region 
b expands as indicated on the graph.
Those consumers on the two shaded rectangle areas switch from buying only one
product to buying both products from the deviating rm, and those on the small
shaded triangle area switch from buying nothing to buying both products from the
deviating rm.
Notice that given a bounded and continuous joint density, the small triangle
area is a second-order e¤ect when  is small, so only the two rectangle areas matter.
The measure of consumers on the vertical rectangle area is 
R1
0
h(0; z2)dz2, and the















where the rst equality used the equilibrium condition (2) in the regime of sepa-




h(z1; 0)dz1, and the deviating rm now makes an extra prot p̂2   from each














is greater than the loss 
b, i.e., if
n[1 H(0; 0)] > H1(0j0) +H2(0j0) : (6)
The following result reports simple primitive conditions for (6) to hold:
Proposition 1 Starting from separate sales with prices dened in (2), each rm
has a strict unilateral incentive to introduce mixed bundling if (6) holds.





(ii) For a given n, (6) holds if X1 and X2 are independent, negatively dependent (in
the sense that Pr(Xi > ajXj > b) is decreasing in b for any a), or limitedly positively
dependent (in the sense that Pr(Xi > ajXj > b)  Pr(Xi > a) for any a and b, and
d
dt
Hi(0jH 1j (t)) >  1 for t 2 [1  1n ; 1]).
The duopoly and the independence result are relatively easy to understand. Both
can be seen from the condition for p̂i to be the equilibrium price in the benchmark
regime of separate sales. With separate sales, if a rm unilaterally lowers its price,




b is the num-
ber of consumers who buy product 1 from the rm (and is actually equal to 1
n
in a symmetric equilibrium), and the (rst-order) gain is p̂1
R1
 1 h(0; z2)dz2 where

R1
 1 h(0; z2)dz2 is the measure of consumers who switch to buying product 1 from
the rm in question, i.e., the vertical shaded area on Figure 1 extended to the lower
bound of z2. These two terms must be equal in equilibrium. Since h(0; z2) is sym-





b). A similar result holds for the second gain (4) when a rm lowers
its price p̂2 slightly. Therefore, the sum of the two gains equals (
1 +
b) and it is
clearly greater than the loss 
b caused by a small bundling discount.
In the independence case, the loss 







h(z1; z2)dz1dz2 as the loss when a rm was able to lower




in (3) as the associated gain. When Z1 and Z2 are independent, these two e¤ects
cancel out each other if and only if two similar e¤ects are also equal when the





h(z1; z2)dz1dz2 = p̂1
R1
 1 h(0; z2)dz2,
where the rst term is equal to (
1 + 
b). As explained above, this is just the
equilibrium condition for p̂1. Therefore, the sum of the two gains must exceed the
loss. (This explanation is the same as in the monopoly case in McAfee, McMillan,
and Whinston (1989).)
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The result with many rms has a similar intuition as in the independence case.
In the proof we show that the loss 
b is approximately equal to one of the gains
when n is large. Intuitively, when there are many rms, the measure of consumers
in the region of 
b is close to zero since a rms product is almost surely dominated
by the best rival product. Then the potential correlation between Z1 and Z2 in that
region plays a rather limited role.
In general, given other rms are selling their products separately, a rms problem
of whether to introduce mixed bundling is essentially a monopoly problem where a
consumers net valuation for its product i is Xi  (Yi  p̂i). Here Yi  p̂i is regarded
as a random outside option. Then our incentive results in part (ii) of Proposition
1 are closely related to the existing works on the protability of mixed bundling in
a monopoly setting. For example, McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) have
shown a general su¢ cient condition for mixed bundling to be protable and the
condition must hold when valuations are independent across products. Using a
copula approach, Chen and Riordan (2013) have further identied simple primitive
conditions when valuations are dependent. (Our proof for the cases with dependent
valuations closely follows their approach.) However, the additional structure in our
symmetric oligopoly setting leads to the result for n = 2 (which has also been derived
by Armstrong and Vickers (2010) in their Hotelling model), and the result for a large
n (which is new in the literature).
4 Mixed-bundling equilibrium
In this section, we characterize a mixed-bundling pricing equilibrium (if it exists) and
derive the general formula of the impacts of mixed bundling on prot and consumer
surplus relative to separate sales. We will consider some special cases in next section
where more analytical progress can be made.
Consider a symmetric mixed-bundling equilibrium (p1; p2; ), where pi is the price
of single product i and  is the bundling discount. We focus on the equilibrium with
  minfp1; p2g, in which case P = p1 + p2     maxfp1; p2g and so the bundle is
no cheaper than any single product.13
4.1 Demand
We rst need to investigate rms demand in the mixed-bundling regime. Sup-
pose that a rm unilaterally deviates to a pricing schedule (p01; p
0
2; 
0) with 0 
13We are not claiming that it is impossible to have an equilibrium with P < maxfp1; p2g. (In
that case, at least one single product is never sold alone as long as consumers have free disposal
of either single product from the bundle.) Such a possible equilibrium, however, involves rms
playing weakly dominated strategies: a rm can always earn the same prot by reducing the price
of the more expensive single product so that P = maxfp1; p2g.
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minfp01; p02g,14 while other rms stick to the equilibrium pricing schedule. Then for
a consumer who values this rms products at (x1; x2) and the best products from
other rms at (y1; y2), she has the following four purchase options:
(a) buy both products from the deviating rm, in which case her surplus is
x1 + x2   (p01 + p02   0);
(b) buy product 1 from the deviating rm but product 2 elsewhere, in which
case her surplus is x1 + y2   p01   p2;
(c) buy product 2 from the deviating rm but product 1 elsewhere, in which case
her surplus is y1 + x2   p1   p02;
(d) buy both products from other rms, in which case her surplus is    (p1 +
p2  ), where  is a random variable conditional on (y1; y2) as dened in (7) below.
When the consumer buys only one product, say, product i from some other rm,
she will buy the one with the highest match utility yi. When she buys both products
from other rms, however, she does not always buy the two with the highest match
utilities (y1; y2) if n  3. This is because she may choose to buy the two products
from a single rm due to the bundling discount but (y1; y2) are not realized at that
rm. For this reason, (y1; y2) is not a su¢ cient statistic for the match utilities from
other rms. This is the main source of the complication in studying competitive
bundling when we go beyond the duopoly case. To derive , we discuss two cases:
First, if y1 and y2 are realized at the same rm, how to buy in option (d) is
simple: the consumer will just buy both products from that rm, and so  = y1+y2.
Conditional on Y1 = y1 and Y2 = y2, this event occurs with probability
(y1; y2) 
(n  1)f(y1; y2)F (y1; y2)n 2
g(y1; y2)
;
where the numerator is the probability in the density sense that Y1 = y1 and Y2 = y2
are realized in the same rm among n   1 ones, and the denominator is the joint
pdf of (Y1; Y2), i.e., the probability that Y1 = y1 and Y2 = y2 in the density sense.15
Notice that (i) when n = 2, (y1; y2) = 1; (ii) when the two products at each rm
have independent match utilities, (y1; y2) simplies to 1n 1 as expected.
Second, with the rest of the probability 1 (y1; y2), y1 and y2 are realized at two
di¤erent rms. Then the consumer faces the trade-o¤ between consuming better-
matched products by two-stop shopping, in which case she gets surplus y1 + y2  
(p1+p2), or enjoying the bundling discount by one-stop shopping, in which case she
gets surplus Y (y1; y2) (p1+p2 ), where Y (y1; y2) denotes the match utility of the
best bundle among n   1 rms conditional on Y1 = y1 and Y2 = y2 being realized
at di¤erent rms. Hence, in this second case,  = maxfY (y1; y2); y1 + y2   g.
(The conditional distribution of Y (y1; y2) is important but complicated for demand
calculation. We characterize it in Lemma 2 in the appendix.)
14As explained in footnote 13, other pricing schedules are weakly dominated.





In sum, conditional on Y1 = y1 and Y2 = y2, we have
 =
8<: y1 + y2 with probability (y1; y2)
maxfY (y1; y2); y1 + y2   g with probability 1  (y1; y2)
: (7)
When n = 2, y1 and y2 must be from the same rm and so  = y1 + y2 for sure.
Then the problem can be converted into an often used two-dimensional Hotelling
model by using two locationrandom variables Z1 = X1   Y1 and Z2 = X2   Y2.
Given (y1; y2; ) where  is a realization of , Figure 2 below describes how a
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Figure 2: The pattern of consumer choice conditional on (y1; y2; )
As before, 
i, i = 1; 2, indicates the region where the consumer buys only product i
from the deviating rm, and 
b indicates the region where the consumer buys both
products from it. Then integrating the area of 
i over (y1; y2; ) yields the demand
for the deviating rms single product i, and integrating the area of 
b over (y1; y2; )
yields the demand for its bundle.








f(x1; x2)dx1dx2] ; (8)







f(x1; x2)dx1dx2] : (9)
(All the expectations in this paper are taken over (y1; y2; ).) Given full market
coverage, the equilibrium demand depends only on the bundling discount  but
13
not on any single-product price. Let 
b() be the equilibrium demand for a rms







This is because, with full market coverage, all consumers buy product i, so 1=n
of them should buy it from a particular rm (via either single product purchase or
bundle purchase). This also implies that 
1() = 
2(), even when the two products
are asymmetric.
4.2 Equilibrium prices
We now characterize the necessary conditions for (p1; p2; ) to be an equilibrium
pricing schedule. Using Figure 2, one can write down a rms deviation prot func-
tion and then derive the rst-order conditions. To better understand the economics
behind the rst-order conditions, here we adopt the following graphic approach by
considering a few local deviations. (This local-deviation argument is in the spirit
of the analysis in McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) and is also used in
Armstrong and Vickers (2010). Readers who want to skip the details can jump to
Proposition 2 directly.)
First, suppose a rm unilaterally raises its bundling discount to 0 =  + ",
where " > 0 is small, while keeps its single-product prices unchanged. Figure 3a
below describes, conditional on (y1; y2; ), how this small deviation a¤ects consumer
choices: 
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Figure 3a: Price deviation and consumer choice I






f(y1   ; x2)dx2 and ~2 =
Z x1
 y2+
f(x1; y2   )dx1
are the densities of marginal consumers along the vertical and horizontal line seg-




f(x1;    x1)dx1
is the density of marginal consumers along the diagonal line segment. For the
marginal consumers on the vertical shaded area (which has a measure of "~1), they
switch from buying only product 2 to buying both products from the deviating
rm, and so the rm makes p1    " extra prot from each of them. Similarly, the
deviating rm makes p2      " extra prot from each of the marginal consumers
on the horizontal shaded area (which has a measure of "~2). For those marginal
consumers on the diagonal shaded area (which has a measure of "~), they switch
from buying both products from other rms to buying both from the deviating rm.
So the deviating rm makes p1 + p2      " extra prot from each of them. The
only negative e¤ect of the deviation is that those consumers on 
b who were already
purchasing both products at the deviating rm now each pay " less. The sum
of all these e¤ects integrated over (y1; y2; ) should be equal to zero in equilibrium.
After all the second-order e¤ects being discarded, this yields the following rst-order
condition:
1(p1   ) + 2(p2   ) + (p1 + p2   ) = 
b() ; (11)
where
i  E[~i];   E[~] ; (12)
and 
b() is dened in (10).
Second, suppose a rm unilaterally raises its stand-alone price p1 to p01 = p1 + "
and its bundling discount to 0 =  + " (such that its bundle price remains un-
changed). Figure 3b below describes how this small deviation a¤ects consumer
choices: 
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f(   y2 + ; x2)dx2
is the density of marginal consumers along the vertical line segment on the graph.
For those marginal consumers on the horizontal shaded area (which has a measure
of "~2), they switch from buying only product 1 to buying both products from the
deviating rm. So the rm makes p2    extra prot from each of them. For those
marginal consumers on the vertical shaded area (which has a measure of "~2), they
switch from buying product 1 to buying nothing from the deviating rm. So the
rm loses p1 from each of them. The direct revenue e¤ect of this deviation is that
the rm earns " more from each consumer on 
1. The sum of these e¤ects integrated
over (y1; y2; ) should be equal to zero in equilibrium. This yields another rst-order
condition:
2(p2   ) + 
1() = 2p1 ; (13)
where
2  E[~2] ; (14)
and 
1() is dened in (8).
Third, suppose a rm slightly raises its stand-alone price p2 to p02 = p2+" and its
bundling discount to 0 =  + " (such that its bundle price remains unchanged). (If
the two products are symmetric, there is no need to consider this third deviation.)
Then 
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f(x1;    y1 + )dx1
is the density of marginal consumers along the horizontal line segment on the graph.
A similar argument as before yields the third rst-order condition:
1(p1   ) + 
2() = 1p2 ; (15)
where
1  E[~1] ; (16)
and 
2() is dened in (8).
The following result rewrites the above three rst-order conditions:16
Proposition 2 If a symmetric mixed-bundling equilibrium with   minfp1; p2g
exists, the single-product prices p1 and p2 and the bundling discount  must satisfy









(2   1)p1 + (1   2)p2 + (1 + 2) = 2
1() ; (19)
where i, i and  are dened in (12), (14) and (16) as functions of  only.
16Notice that (17) is derived from the rst and the second rst-order condition (11) and (13) by
using (10), and (18) is derived from the rst and the third one (11) and (15) by using (10). Adding




One can check that the rst two conditions (17) and (18) are actually the rst-
order conditions from considering a deviation of raising a single-product price but
keeping the bundling discount unchanged. We refer to these two conditions as single-
product price equations. Since they are linear in p1 and p2, from them one can solve
p1 and p2 as functions of . Substituting them into the third condition, which is
referred to as the discount equation, yields an equation of . These equations are
more complicated than they appear because all i, i and  are functions of . In
general little can be said on how mixed bundling a¤ects market prices relative to
separate sales. More progress will be made in a few special cases studied in Section
5.
Discussion: equilibrium existence. To prove the existence of the above symmetric
equilibrium, we need to show that (i) the system of necessary conditions (17)-(19)
has a solution with   minfp1; p2g, and (ii) the necessary conditions are also
su¢ cient for dening the equilibrium prices. Unfortunately, both issues are hard to
investigate in general. For the rst one, we will prove it in the i.i.d. case when n = 2
under a log-concavity condition or when n is su¢ ciently large. For the second one,
no analytical progress has been made in general even in the duopoly case.17 This is
an unsolved problem in the literature on mixed bundling.18
4.3 Impact of mixed bundling
Given the assumption of full market coverage, the impact of mixed bundling on total
welfare is straightforward. Total welfare is solely determined by the match quality
between consumers and products. Since the bundling discount induces consumers
to one-stop shop too often, mixed bundling must lower match quality and so total
welfare relative to separate sales. In the following, we examine the impacts of mixed
bundling on industry prot and consumer surplus.
Let (p1; p2; ) denote the equilibrium industry prot. Then
(p1; p2; ) = p1 + p2   n
b() :
Every consumer buys both products, but those who buy both from the same rm
17See, for example, a discussion of this issue in footnote 19 in Armstrong and Vickers (2010).
They claim that in the Hotelling setup with uniformly distributed consumers the rst-order condi-
tions are also su¢ cient for dening the equilibrium. We can further verify that in the i.i.d. duopoly
case, if the valuation distribution F is uniform or exponential, each rms prot function is locally
concave at the equilibrium prices.
18In our pricing game, each rms prot function is continuous since the consumer match utility
distribution is assumed to be continuous. If rms do not choose an innite price (e.g., due to
consumersbudget constraints), their pricing strategy space is compact. Then it is well-known
that our pricing game must have a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Moreover, given our game is
symmetric, according to Becker and Damianov (2006), there must exist a symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium.
18
pay  less. Thus, relative to separate sales the impact of mixed bundling on industry
prot is
  (p1; p2; )  (p̂1; p̂2; 0) = (p1   p̂1) + (p2   p̂2)  n
b()
= P   P̂ + n
1() ; (20)
where we used 
1+
b = 1=n in the second equality. (Recall that p̂i and P̂ = p̂1+ p̂2
are respectively the stand-alone price and the bundle price in the regime of separate
sales.) Two simple cases are: if bundling lowers both stand-alone prices (and so the
bundle price as well), it must harm industry prot; if bundling raises the bundle
price, it must enhance industry prot. (When the two products are asymmetric,
a more expensive bundle does not necessarily require each single product be more
expensive, but the sum of the two stand-alone prices must increase.)
Let v(~p1; ~p2; ~) denote the consumer surplus when all rms charge stand-alone
prices (~p1; ~p2) and o¤er a bundling discount ~. Given full market coverage, an
envelope argument implies that vi(~p1; ~p2; ~) =  1, i = 1; 2, and v3(~p1; ~p2; ~) =
n
b(~), where the subscripts indicate partial derivatives. This is because raising ~pi
by a small " will make every consumer pay " more, and raising the discount ~ by "
will save " for every consumer who buy both products from the same rm.19 Then
relative to separate sales, the impact of mixed bundling on consumer surplus is
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where we used 
1 + 
b = 1=n in the last equality. This formula implies that if
bundling makes each single product cheaper, it must improve consumer welfare even
if the bundling discount causes some product mismatch. This is simply because of
a revealed-preference argument: consumers can at least buy the same products as
they would buy in the case of separate sales but now at lower prices. In contrast,
if bundling makes the bundle more expensive, it must harm consumers. This is
because in this case we already know that industry prot must go up but bundling
always reduces total welfare.20
19More rigorously, raising the discount slightly will also increase the number of consumers who
choose to one-stop shop, but the a¤ected consumers are those who were initially almost indi¤erent
between one-stop shopping and two-stop shopping. Therefore, the impact from these marginal
consumers is of second order when " is small.





1(~)d~], a formula of how mixed
bundling impacts total welfare relative to separate sales. Consistent with the claim made before,
this impact must be negative as 
1(~) decreases in ~.
19
In sum, if bundling makes each single product cheaper, it must harm rms and
benet consumers; if bundling makes the bundle more expensive, it must help rms
and harm consumers; the less clear case is when bundling makes single products
more expensive but the bundle cheaper.
5 Special cases
To make more progress, in this section we focus on the i.i.d. case where the two
products at each rm are symmetric and have independent match utilities. Slightly
abusing the notation, let F (x) and f(x) be the common cdf and pdf of Xi, and let
H(z) =
Z
F (y + z)dF (y)n 1 and h(z) =
Z
f(y + z)dF (y)n 1
be respectively the common cdf and pdf of Zi = Xi   Yi. (When n = 2, h(z) is
symmetric around zero.) Let p be the common single-product price, and let  = i
and  = i. Then the single-product price equations (17) and (18) simplify to
p =
1=n+ (+ )
+  + 2
; (22)
and the discount equation (19) simplies to
(   ) p+  = 
1() : (23)
The di¢ culty in making analytical progress is from the complication of , , ,
and 
1(). However, they are simple in the duopoly case, and they also have simple
(rst-order) Taylor approximations if  is small, which, as we show below, is usually
the case when the number of rms is large.
5.1 Revisit the duopoly case
We rst revisit the duopoly case. With  = y1 + y2, our random utility model can
be converted into a two-dimensional Hotelling model with two locationvariables
Zi = Xi   Yi, i = 1; 2. This case has been extensively studied in the literature (see,
e.g., Armstrong and Vickers (2010) for a general treatment). Here we report some
results that have not been noticed before.
Using the symmetry of h, one can check that21




1() = [1 H()]2 :
21It may not be obvious to derive the expression for  from (12). Using  = y1 + y2 in the
duopoly case, we have  = E[
R y1+
y1  f(x1)f(y1 + y2   x1)dx1] = E[
R 
  f(y1   t)f(y2 + t)dt], where
the second equality is from changing the variable from x1 to t = y1   x1. Then the denition of h
implies  =
R 
  h( t)h(t)dt = 2
R 
0
h(t)2dt, where the second equality is from the symmetry of h
in the duopoly case. All these expressions for , ,  and 
1 can also be seen from Figure 5 below.
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The most often studied example in the literature is when H is a uniform dis-
tribution.22 Suppose H is uniform on [ 1; 1]. Then it is easy to check that in the
regime of separate sales, each product is sold at price p̂ = 1; in the regime of mixed
bundling, the single-product price drops to p = 11
12
, the bundling discount is  = 0:5,
and so the bundle price is P = 4
3
. Both the stand-alone products and the bundle
become cheaper under mixed bundling. Therefore, in this example, mixed bundling
intensies price competition and results in a prisoners dilemma outcome for rms
(   0:6), but it benets consumers (v  0:52). This observation is what the
existing literature highlights.
In the following, we argue that the impacts of mixed bundling in the duopoly case
are actually sensitive to the underlying valuation distribution. The following table
reports the comparison between the two regimes in a few other examples (where the
distributions are F instead of H):
p̂ p  P  v ( + v)
Uniform 0:5 0:57 1=3 0:81  0:16 0:10  0:06
Normal 1:77 1:85 1:06 2:63  1:10 0:93  0:17
Exponential 1 1:5 1 2 0:07  0:22  0:15
Pareto 5=8 1:48 1:37 1:58 0:37  0:52  0:15
Table 1: Impact of mixed bundling in duopoly
Prices. In the example of uniform distribution with F (x) = x or standard normal
distribution, compared to separate sales, mixed bundling makes each single product
more expensive but the bundle cheaper; in the example of standard exponential
distribution or Pareto distribution with F (x) = 1  1
x2
on [1;1), it (weakly) increases
all prices. More generally, we have the following results:





 0) in z > 0 (which is true if f is log-concave). Then
(i) the system of (25) and (24) has a unique solution with  2 (0; p);
(ii) relative to separate sales, mixed bundling lowers the bundle price, and it raises






for z > 0.
22This is the standard case in the Hotelling model, but in our random utility setup it is possible
only if we consider correlated match utilities across rms since X   Y cannot have a uniform
distribution when X and Y are independent of each other.
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Recall that our demand analysis is predicated on   p, i.e., the bundle is no
cheaper than each single product. This is true at least under the log-concavity
condition as shown in result (i), but can also be true even beyond this log-concavity
case as suggested by the Pareto example. Result (ii) shows that under the log-
concavity condition the bundle becomes cheaper in the mixed-bundling regime, but
each single product becomes more expensive if 1 H(z)
h(z)
does not decrease too fast
(which requires the tail of the density h(z) decrease fast enough). (It appears harder
to nd a simple general condition for each single product to become cheaper.) The
proof of result (ii) also reveals that once 1 H becomes log-convex, even the bundle
will become more expensive in the mixed-bundling regime. 1   H is log-concave
in the rst two examples and log-convex in the last example, and the exponential
example is the edge case where 1 H is log-linear and so the bundle price remains
unchanged.23
Prot and consumer surplus. Armstrong and Vickers (2010) have derived a suf-
cient condition in their Proposition 4 for mixed bundling to harm rms and benet






for z  0. When this condition is not satised, the welfare impacts of mixed
bundling can be reversed. For instance, in the exponential or Pareto example mixed
bundling helps rms but harms consumers. It is also possible that both rms and
consumers su¤er from mixed bundling. Consider a generalized Pareto distribution
with F (x) = 1   (1   ax) 1a , where a 2 [0; 1] and the support is [0; 1
a
]. It has a
log-concave density, and it becomes the exponential distribution when a = 0 and
the uniform distribution when a = 1. Figure 4 below depicts how the impacts of
mixed bundling in this example vary with a.








Figure 4: The example of generalized Pareto distribution
When a is su¢ ciently large, mixed bundling harms rms and benets consumers as
in the uniform example; when a is su¢ ciently small, the opposite is true as in the
exponential example; in between mixed bundling harms both rms and consumers.
23When F is expotential, H is a double exponential distribution and so 1   H is log-linear in
z > 0.
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Intuition. Why can the underlying valuation distribution qualitatively matter
for the impacts of mixed bundling? This can be seen from how the bundling discount
a¤ects rmssingle-product pricing incentives. Suppose rm 1 raises p1 by a small
" > 0 but keeps p2 and  unchanged. Figure 5 below depicts how this small deviation
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Figure 5: Price deviation and consumer choice in duopoly
Roughly, the marginal consumers with a measure of "(++) stop buying rm 1s
product 1, causing a loss "p1(+  + ).24 Among these marginal consumers, those
on the diagonal shaded area  actually stop buying the whole bundle, which causes
an extra loss "(p2 ). As emphasized in the literature, this double losse¤ect, or
double prote¤ect if we consider a price reduction, is the source for bundling to
intensify price competition. However, notice that bundling also changes the position
of marginal consumers and so potentially their density: in separate sales with  = 0,
+  +  = h(0); in mixed bundling with  > 0, +  +  becomes smaller if h(z)
is single-peaked at z = 0. This is a force to relax price competition. When h is
uniform, this second force does not exist, so as we have seen mixed bundling lowers
all prices; but if h decreases fast enough on both sides of z = 0, this second force
can play a dominant role such that bundling raises all prices as we have seen in the
exponential or Pareto example. Therefore, when h has heavier tails (in which case
the tails usually decrease faster), it is more likely that mixed bundling helps relax
price competition.
In sum, in the duopoly case the impacts of mixed bundling on prices, prot
and consumer welfare are ambiguous in general. We should be cautious about the
24More precisely, those marginal consumers on the shaded area  only pay p1   less when they
switch from buying the bundle to buying product 2 only, so the loss should be "[p1(++) ].
23
policy implications drawn from some convenient examples such as the widely used
Hotelling model with uniformly distributed consumers.
5.2 The case with many rms
Another case where we can make analytical progress is when n is large. In this
case, we show that mixed bundling has less ambiguous impacts, and under a mild
condition it intensies price competition, harms rms and benets consumers.
We rst report a useful approximation result based on Taylor expansion when 
is small:
Lemma 1 For any given n  2, if  is close to zero, we have the following approx-







































f(x)dF (x)n 1 and h0(0) =
R
f 0(x)dF (x)n 1.
These approximations are much simpler than the original expressions and give us
some idea of how these objects vary with  and n. One observation that is useful
for our analysis below is +  +   h(0).
When n is large, we show in the appendix that the system of (22) and (23) usually
has a solution with  close to zero. Then Lemma 1 can be used to approximate the
equilibrium mixed-bundling prices.
Proposition 4 Suppose limn!1 p̂ = 0, where p̂ = 1nh(0) is the separate-sales price
in (2), and jh
0(0)j
h(0)




bounded). When n is large, the system of (22) and (23) has a solution with  2 (0; p)













Both the single-product price and the bundle price are lower than in the regime of
separate sales.
24
Note that both required conditions are satised if f(x) is strictly positive on
a bounded support and jf 0(x)j < 1.25 This proposition implies that when there
are many rms in the market, mixed bundling tends to be pro-competitive relative
to separate sales (though the impact is small as the outcome is close to perfect
competition in either case). As we discussed in the duopoly case, the bundling
discount  makes the competition boundary  doubly protable when a rm lowers
a single-product price, which is a force to intensify price competition; at the same
time  also shifts the position of marginal consumers along the boundaries , 
and  and so may a¤ect the density of them, which can be a force in the opposite
direction. When  is small, however, from the approximations in (26), we see that
 +  +   h(0), i.e., the small discount has no rst-order e¤ect on the density
of marginal consumers. As a result, only the former double prote¤ect matters.
This implies that mixed bundling is pro-competitive if  is small (which is usually
the case when n is large). This discussion also suggests that even with a small
number of rms, if the bundling discount is capped at a low level, price competition
is ercer in the regime of mixed bundling than in the regime of separate sales.
For a large n, we can further simplify the approximations in (27) to p  p̂ and
  1
2
p̂. That is, the single-product price is approximately equal to the price in
the regime of separate sales and the bundling discount is approximately half of the
single-product price. The mixed-bundling scheme in this limit case can thus be
interpreted as 50% o¤ for the second product.26
When Proposition 4 holds, mixed bundling reduces all prices relative to separate
sales, so it must harm rms and benet consumers according to Section 4.3. To-
gether with the duopoly case, this suggests that the impacts of mixed bundling can
qualitatively depend on the number of rms in the market.
6 Discussion
6.1 Multi-stop shopping cost as a bundling discount
A situation similar to mixed bundling is when rms use linear pricing strategies but
consumers face an exogenous multi-stop shopping cost  > 0. That is, if a consumer
25Among the examples we studied in the duopoly case, the normal, exponential, and Pareto
distribution have an unbounded support, and the generalized Pareto distribution with a 2 (0; 1)
has f(x) = 0 and limx!x f 0(x)=f(x) = 1. But if we consider a properly truncated version of
those distributions, these issues disappear and meanwhile the results in those examples remain
qualitatively unchanged. For instance, for a truncated exponential distribution with support [0; 5],
mixed bundling improves prot by about 0:05 and reduces consumer surplus by about 0:19 in the
duopoly case.
26This interpretation works only when the production cost is zero. If there is a positive produc-
tion cost c for each product, we have   (p̂   c)=2, i.e., the bundling discount is approximately
equal to half of the single products markup.
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buys two products from two di¤erent rms, she needs to pay an extra cost , which
reects, for instance, the extra travelling cost or the transaction cost of paying an
additional bill. If the shopping cost is not prohibitively high and some consumers
still multi-stop shop, it then a¤ects consumer purchase behavior exactly the same as
the bundling discount. Therefore, the method developed in this paper can be used
to investigate the impact of multi-stop shopping cost on competition and market
performance. We show that the number of rms can play an important role in
determining whether the shopping cost harms or improves consumer welfare.
Following a similar analysis as in Section 4.2, one can derive the rst-order
conditions for (p1; p2) to be the equilibrium prices:
(1 + 2 + )p1 + p2 =
1
n




(These two conditions di¤er from the single-product price equations (17) and (18)




n(+  + 2)
:
In general it is unclear how  +  + 2 varies with the shopping cost . However,







< p̂ : (28)
That is, introducing a small shopping cost will induce a ercer competition among
rms. The underlying reason is the same as in the case with a small bundling
discount explained before.27
Although a small shopping friction lowers market prices, it also adversely a¤ects
the match quality between consumers and products. As a result, its impact on
consumers is less clear.
Proposition 5 Suppose  is an exogenous multi-stop shopping cost and rms com-
pete in linear prices. In the i.i.d. case, if  is small, it intensies price competition
for any n, but it benets consumers if and only if n  3.
Intuitively, the price-reduction e¤ect of shopping costs is more signicant when
there are fewer competitors, while the match quality e¤ect is larger when there are
more rms. That is why introducing a small shopping cost benets consumers in
equilibrium only when there are relatively few rms. Notice that when n is large,
27This argument, however, can fail when  is larger. For example, when  is su¢ ciently large,
the situation will be as if all rms use a pure-bundling strategy. According to Zhou (2017), we
know that pure bundling often induces higher market prices than in separate sales when n is above
a threshold. Hence, in general whether the presence of shopping cost  intensies or softens price
competition depends both on the magnitude of  and the number of rms.
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the impact on consumers is opposite to what we see in the mixed-bundling case, but
this is simply because  is a shopping cost here but a benecial discount there.
6.2 Bundling premium
So far we have ruled out the possibility of bundling premium (in which case the
bundle price exceeds the sum of component prices). Bundling premium, even if
it is desirable for rms, is usually hard to implement as it requires rms be able
to monitor consumer purchase behavior; otherwise no consumers would buy the
bundle at an additional cost. It might be becoming technically more feasible in
the online market (e.g., for some digital goods) where rms have better monitoring
technologies.
Starting from the separate-sales equilibrium, the analysis of the incentive to
introduce a small bundling premium is very similar to Section 3. The demand
pattern when a rm unilaterally charges a small bundling premium  > 0 is depicted
on Figure 6 where 

















ppppppppppppppppppp ppppppppppppppppppp pppppppppppppppppp pppppppppppppppppp
buy both from
other rms
Figure 6: The impact of a small bundling premium on demand
Compared to Figure 1, the competition boundaries di¤er: 
1 and 
2 are now con-
nected by a boundary (the short diagonal segment), while 
b and the region of
buying both products from other rms become disconnected. This, however, does
not a¤ect the rst-order analysis of a small deviation. One can show that introduc-
ing a small bundling premium is protable if condition (6) is reversed. Therefore,
if bundling premium is also feasible, a unilateral deviation to mixed bundling is
generically protable. (McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) made a similar
observation in the monopoly case.)
The necessary conditions for an equilibrium with a bundling premium (if it exists)
can be derived similarly as in the case of bundling discount. Instead of going through
27
all the analysis again, here we briey consider the simple i.i.d. duopoly case. If an
equilibrium with a single-product price p and a bundling premium  > 0 exists, then















1 H() = 2 :
This equation, however, has no solution of  > 0 if h is log-concave (which is the
case if f is log-concave). When  = 0, the left-hand side equals   1
h(0)
, less than the
right-hand side; meanwhile, the left-hand side decreases in  if h is log-concave while
the right-hand side increases in  .28 Therefore, under the log-concavity condition,
this i.i.d. duopoly case has no equilibrium with a bundling premium. Of course, in
a more general case (e.g., when the valuations for the two products are correlated),
it is possible that bundling premium arises in equilibrium and it can be investigated
similarly as in Section 4.
7 Conclusion
This paper has studied competitive mixed bundling in an oligopoly market by using a
random-utility framework. It explains the source of di¢ culty in studying competitive
mixed bundling beyond the duopoly case, and develops a method to calculate the
demand and characterize the necessary conditions for equilibrium tari¤s. Analytical
progress on the impacts of bundling on prices, prot and consumer welfare is only
made in the duopoly case (where we derive some new results compared to the existing
literature) and the case with many rms (where a simple approximation of the
equilibrium tari¤ is o¤ered). We show that the impact of bundling in the duopoly
case is sensitive to the underlying consumer valuation distribution, while in the case
with many rms, the impact is less ambiguous and bundling tends to lower market
prices, harm rms and benet consumers. This suggests that the number of rms
can qualitatively matter for the assessment of the impact of mixed bundling.
As in most theoretical studies on bundling, we have focused on the case with two
products only. This is not meant to be realistic. In many examples of bundling, rms
sell more than two products. The problem when there are more than two products
is that the pricing strategy space will become much more complicated since rms
can set a distinct price for each subset of its products. This is hard to deal with even
in the duopoly case, as discussed in the appendix of Armstrong and Vickers (2010).
28When h is log-concave, both 1  H and H are log-concave, and so 1 Hh is decreasing and
H
h
is increasing; meanwhile, 2 H1 H is clearly increasing.
28
One possible way to proceed is to consider simple pricing policies such as two-part
tari¤s or bundle-size pricing schemes as in Chu, Leslie, and Sorensen (2011). Another
feature which is not captured in this paper and many other bundling papers is that
some consumers may only need a subset of the products. This possible demand
heterogeneity has been studied in Thanassoulis (2007, 11) and it can generate some
interesting distributional e¤ect of bundling on di¤erent types of consumers.
We have also focused on the case where each rm makes their mixed-bundling de-
cisions independently. There are examples where rival rms coordinate on cross-rm
joint-purchase discounts (e.g., a discounted city pass that covers various separately
owned museums). See, e.g., Gans and King (2006), Armstrong (2013), and Jeitschko,
Jung, and Kim (2017) for research on this type of cross-rm bundling. These papers
consider single-product rms, but in principle, cross-rm joint-purchase discounts
can also be o¤ered by competing multiproduct rms.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The duopoly result. When n = 2, we have Yi = Xi. Then






j should share the same conditional
distribution. This implies H1(0j0) = H2(0j0) = 1=2. Meanwhile, H(0; 0) is always
strictly less than Hi(0) = 1=2. Then
2[1 H(0; 0)] > 2[1 Hi(0)] = 1 = H1(0j0) +H2(0j0) :
The independence result. When the two products have independent valuations,
Hi(0j0) = Hi(0) and H(0; 0) = H1(0)H2(0). Given Hi(0) = 1   1n , it is ready to
check that the gain (5) is twice the loss 
b for any n.
To prove the other su¢ cient conditions for (6), we use the copula approach
introduced in Chen and Riordan (2013). (A classic reference on copula is Nel-
son, 2006.) Let C(t1; t2) be the copula associated with the joint cdf H such that
H(z1; z2) = C(H1(z1); H2(z2)). According to the Sklars Theorem, such a copula
exists uniquely for a given joint cdf if its marginal distributions are continuous.
Therefore, a joint cdf can be represented by its marginal cdfs and a copula. A cop-
ula itself is a joint cdf on [0; 1]2 with uniform marginal distributions, and it captures
the dependence structure of the original distribution. Let Ci(t1; t2) be the partial
derivative with respect to ti. Let d(t)  C(t; t) be the diagonal section of C, and it
is increasing and uniformly continuous on [0; 1]. The following properties on copula
are useful:
(a) C(t1; 0) = C(0; t2) = 0;
(b) C(t1; 1) = t1 and C(1; t2) = t2;
(c) Ci(t1; t2) is the conditional distribution of t i given ti;
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(d) maxf0; 2t  1g  d(t)  t.
We rst claim that (6) is equivalent to
1  d(t) > (1  t)d0(t) at t = 1  1
n
. (29)
The denition of copula and Hi(0) = 1  1n imply that





h(z1; z2) = C12(H1(z1); H2(z2))h1(z1)h2(z2) (30)
and property (a), one can check that H1(0j0) = C2(t; t) and H2(0j0) = C1(t; t) at
t = 1  1
n
. Then (6) can be written as n(1  d(t)) > C1(t; t) + C2(t; t) at t = 1  1n
which is equivalent to (29).
The large-n result. Given d(1) = 1 (which can be seen from property (b)),
(29) holds for a su¢ ciently large n if d(t) is strictly convex at t = 1. Notice that
d00(1) = C11(1; 1) + 2C12(1; 1) + C22(1; 1) = 2C12(1; 1) since Cii(1; 1) = 0 (which is
again from property (b)). Then d00(1) > 0 if and only if C12(1; 1) > 0, which is
equivalent to the condition stated in the proposition according to (30).
To understand the intuition of this large-n result explained in the main text, we
approximate the loss and gain from the small bundling discount using the copula.
Note that 
b = 2n   1 + H(0; 0) =
2
n
  1 + d(t) at t = 1   1
n
. When t = 1   "
with "  0, we have d(t)  1   2" + 1
2
d00(1)"2, where the approximation is from
Taylor expansion, d(1) = 1 and d0(1) = 2 (both of which are from property (b)).






C12(1; 1) when n is large, where we have






[1  H2(0j0)] = 1n [1   C1(t; t)] at t = 1 
1
n
. When t = 1  " with "  0, we have




h(0; z2)dz2  1n2C12(1; 1) when n is large. Therefore, the loss 
b caused
by a small discount  is approximately equal to one of the gains, which is similar as
in the independence case.
The negative-dependence result. Since Pr(Xi > ajXj > b) decreases in b for any
a, for any given realization of (Yi; Yj) we have Pr(Xi > a+YijXj > b+Yj) decreases
in b. Then Pr(Zi > ajZj > b) decreases in b for any a. (This is called right tail
decreasing in Nelson, 2006.) Corollary 5.2.6. in Nelson (2006) then implies that
for any t 2 (0; 1) we have
Ci(t; t) <
t  C(t; t)
1  t , i = 1; 2 .
So (1  t)d0(t) < 2(t  d(t)). Then a su¢ cient condition for (29) is
1  d(t)  2(t  d(t)), d(t)  2t  1 :
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This is always true given property (d).
The positive-dependence result. As in the proof of Proposition 3 in Chen and
Riordan (2013), (29) can be rewritten as










(This can be veried by using integration by parts and property (b).) Given
Pr(Xi > ajXj > b)  Pr(Xi > a) (which is called positive quadrant depen-
dence in Nelson, 2006), we have F (x1; x2)  F1(x1)F2(x2). This implies that
H(z1; z2)  H1(z1)H2(z2) and so d(t)  t2 for any t. Also notice that C1(~t; t) =
H2(H
 1
2 (t)jH 11 (~t)) = H2(0jH 11 (~t)) at t = 1   1n . Then our condition on the con-
ditional distribution implies that C11(~t; t) >  1 for ~t  t = 1   1n . Similarly,
C22(t; ~t) >  1 for ~t  t = 1   1n . Then the left-hand side of (31) is strictly greater
than (1  t)2   2
R 1
t
(1  ~t)d~t = 0.
Omitted details in demand analysis in section 4.1: Recall that Y (y1; y2)
denotes the match utility of the best bundle among n   1 rms conditional on
Y1 = y1 and Y2 = y2 being realized at di¤erent rms.

















for y 2 [maxfy1 + x2; x1 + y2g; y1 + y2), where Fi(yijyj) is the conditional cdf of yi.
Proof. For a given consumer, let I(yi), i = 1; 2, be the identity of the rm
where yi is realized. The lower bound of Y (y1; y2) is from the fact that the lowest
possible match utility of the bundle from rm I(yi) is yi+xj. We now calculate the
conditional probability of Y (y1; y2) < y. This event occurs if and only if all of the
following three conditions are satised: (i) y1 +X
I(y1)
2 < y, (ii) X
I(y2)
1 + y2 < y, and
(iii) Xk1 + X
k
2 < y for all k 6= I(y1); I(y2) among the n   1 competitors. Given y1




since the cdf of XI(y1)2 conditional on y1 and X
I(y1)
2 < y2 is F2(x2jy1)=F2(y2jy1).





One can also check (with the help of a graph) that the probability that Xk1 +X
k
2 < y












(The term in the bracket is the unconditional probability that (Xk1 ; X
k
2 ) lies in the




2 < y.) Conditional on y1 and y2, these three
events are independent of each other. Therefore, the conditional probability of
Y (y1; y2) < y is as stated in (32).
With this lemma, we can calculate the expectation of any function (Y1; Y2;)








(y1; y2;maxfy; y1 + y2   g)dL(yjy1; y2)]dG(y1; y2) :
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) When 1 H(z) is log-concave, the right-hand side of
(25) is decreasing, and so the equation has a unique solution  > 0. From (24) it is
evident that  < p if +  < 1
2
. This condition can be written as








by using (25) and the denitions of  and . At  = 0, the left-hand side is equal to
1
2
h(0) and the right-hand side is equal to h(0), and so (34) must hold. Meanwhile,
the derivative of the left-hand side is h0() (1 H()) + h()2, and the derivative
of the right-hand side is 1
2(1 H())2 [h
0() (1 H()) + h()]. Given 1   H() is log-
concave and 1  H() < 1
2
for  > 0, both derivatives are positive but the latter is
at least twice the former, and so the result follows.
(ii) The bundle price in the regime of mixed bundling is 2p    = 1
2(+)
, and
that in the regime of separate sales is 1
h(0)
. The former is smaller if and only if
+  > 1
2
h(0) which equals







This is true as the equality holds at  = 0 and the left-hand side is increasing in  if
1 H() is log-concave. (Conversely, the opposite is true if 1 H() is log-convex
and so the left-hand side is decreasing.)
p > p̂ if the right-hand side of (24) increases in  given it is equal to p̂ at  = 0.
One can check this is true if 2( + )2 > h0()(1   H()) + h()2 for any  > 0.
When h is decreasing in  > 0, we have  > 2h()
R 
0
h(t)dt = h()(2H()   1),
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and so  +  > h()H() > 1
2
h(). Therefore, the desired condition holds if
h0()(1 H()) + 1
2






for  > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1: We rst explain how to calculate E[(Y1; Y2;)] dened in











L(y1 + y2   jy1; y2)(y1; y2; y1 + y2   ) +
Z y1+y2
y1+y2 
(y1; y2; y)dL(yjy1; y2)

dG ;
where G(y1; y2) = F (y1; y2)n 1 and L(yjy1; y2) is dened in (32). By integration by










(y1; y2; y)L(yjy1; y2)dy

dG :
Now let us derive the rst-order approximation of . (For our purpose, we do not
need the higher-order approximations.) According to the formula above, we have
 =
Z




'(y1; y2; )dG ; (35)
where
'(y1; y2; ) =
Z y1+y2
y1+y2 
f(y1   )f(y   y1 + )L(yjy1; y2)dy :
When   0, we have f(y1   )  f(y1)  f 0(y1), soZ






n 1 = h(0)  h0(0) :
We also have 1  F (y2 + )  1  F (y2)  f(y2), soZ
(1 F (y2+ ))dG 
Z









'(y1; y2; )dG, notice that '(y1; y2; 0) = 0 and '3(y1; y2; 0) =
f(y1)f(y2) since L(yjy1; y2) is independent of  and L(y1 + y2jy1; y2) = 1. Hence,Z




Substituting these approximations into (35) and discarding all higher order terms
yields the approximation for  in (26). The other approximations can be derived
similarly.
Proof of Proposition 4: We rst show that when n is large, the system of (22)
and (23) has a solution with a small  under mild conditions.
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Then when n is su¢ ciently large, the system of (22) and (23) has a solution with
 2 (0; 1
nh(0)
).
Proof. Using (22), we rewrite (23) as an equation of :
(   ) 1=n+ (+ )
+  + 2| {z }
L()
= 
1()  | {z }
R()
:
Denote the left-hand side by L() and the right-hand side by R().



























Next, we show that L() > R() at  =
1
nh(0)
when n is su¢ ciently large. The












































































Notice that in each expression we just replaced  by 1
nh(0)
and no further approxi-
mations were made.





(   ) > [
1()  ] (+  + 2) : (36)
Using the above approximations, we have

















Then at  = 1
nh(0)



































































where we have used the fact that  +  +   h(0) when  is small. Then the












n  1h(0) : (38)















Treating the left-hand side as a quadratic function of h
0(0)
nh(0)2
, one can show that this














. When n is large,








< 1. Given limn!1 1nh(0) = 0, a simple
su¢ cient condition is that jh
0(0)j
h(0)
is uniformly bounded for any n, which is true if
jf 0(x)j
f(x)
is uniformly bounded for any x.29 This completes the proof of the lemma.
Given the system (22) and (23) has a solution with a small  when n is large,
we can approximate each side of (23) around   0 by using (26) and discarding
all higher order terms. Then it is straightforward to derive (27), from which it is
evident that p < p̂ = 1
nh(0)




is uniformly bounded, one can also check  < p.
Proof of Proposition 5: Following a similar logic as in section 4.3, in this case
we have vi(~p1; ~p2; ~) =  1, i = 1; 2, and v3(~p1; ~p2; ~) =  [1   n
b(~)] =  n
1(~).
Raising the single-product prices has the same marginal e¤ect as before, but now
raising the shopping cost by " will harm each multi-stop-shopping consumer by " and
the number of them is 1 n
b(~). (In the case of mixed bundling, a higher bundling
discount benets each one-stop-shopping consumer and so v3 has the opposite sign.)
Then







f(x) < M for a constant M < 1. Then  Mf(x) < f





f 0(x)dF (x)n 1 < M
R
f(x)dF (x)n 1 for any n. That is,  Mh(0) <
h0(0) < Mh(0) for any n, and so jh
0(0)j
h(0) is uniformly bounded.
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. Therefore, when  is small, v is positive
for n = 2; 3 but negative for n  4.
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